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While hackers and viruses fuel the IS security concerns for organisations, the problems 
posed by employee computer crime should not be underestimated.  Indeed, a growing 
number of IS security researchers have turned their attention to the ‘insider’ threat.  
However, to date, there has been a lack of insight into the relationship between the actual 
behaviour of offenders during the perpetration of computer crime, and the organisational 
context in which the behaviour takes place.  To address this deficiency, this paper advances 
two criminological theories, which it is argued can be used to examine the stages an 
offender must go through in order for a crime to be committed.  In addition, this paper 
illustrates how the two theories, entitled the Rational Choice Perspective and Situational 
Crime Prevention, can be applied to the IS domain, thereby offering a theoretical basis on 
which to analyse the offender/context relationship during the perpetration of computer 
crime. By so doing, practitioners may use these insights to inform and enhance the selection 
of safeguards in a bid to improve prevention programmes.  
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1. Introduction 
While hackers and viruses fuel the security concerns of organisations, the threat of 
employee computer crime should not be overlooked.  This message is echoed by numerous 
security surveys which point to the magnitude of the ‘insider’ problem (CSI/FBI, 2004; 
DTI/PWC, 2004; Ernst &Young, 2004).  The 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security 
Survey (CSI/FBI, 2004) revealed approximately 50% of security breaches occurred within 
the organisation.  From another perspective, respondents to the UK DTI/PWC (2004) 
survey were asked about the source of their worst security incident.  For small size (1-49 
employees) organisations, 32% stated the source was internal.  However, this figure rose to 
46% and 48% respectively for medium (50-249 employees) and large (250 + employees) 
companies.    
 
Against this backdrop, a growing number of researchers have turned their attention to the 
security problems posed by employee computer crime (Straub, 1990; Harrington; 1996; 
Kesar and Rogerson, 1998).  However, to date, there has been a lack of insight into the 
relationship between the actual behaviour of offenders during the perpetration of computer 
crime, and the organisational context in which such behaviour takes place.  To address this 
oversight, this paper focuses on the stages an offender must go through in order for a crime 
to be committed i.e. the procedural stages.  Two criminological theories, entitled the 
Rational Choice Perspective (Clarke and Cornish, 2000) and Situational Crime Prevention 
(Clarke, 1997), are advanced to support analysis of the stages comprising employee 
computer crime.  Rather than focussing on ‘why’ and ‘how’ people become criminals, these 
theories focus on the perpetration of crime.  It is argued that the Rational Choice 
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Perspective and Situational Crime Prevention may complement existing security strategies 
by potentially offering a theoretical basis by which to identify offender behaviour in all of 
the procedural stages, and the associated criminal choices which underpin their actions.  In 
so doing, practitioners may use these insights to inform and enhance the selection of 
safeguards to prevent the successful perpetration of employee computer crime.    
 
The proceeding section of the paper reviews the existing IS security literature related to the 
area of employee computer crime.  This is followed by a discussion which centres on the 
difference between those criminological theories which focuses on the criminal act as 
opposed to theories of criminality.  The discussion serves as an introduction to a description 
of the two bodies of theory advanced in this paper, namely the Rational Choice Perspective 
and Situational Crime Prevention.  The penultimate section discusses how these approaches 
can be applied to address the procedural stages of computer crime, followed by a summary 
of the main arguments and suggestions for future research, which form the conclusion. 
 
 
2. Employees and computer crime 
Within the field of IS security, there are a number of studies related to the area of employee 
computer crime.  This section of the paper, therefore, reviews this literature, which can be 
seen to fall into five areas and covers safeguards, deterring offenders, criminal intentions, 
attributes for offending and the criminal environment.   
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2.1 Safeguards 
Several writers have discussed the range of controls which can be used as a safeguard 
against computer crime by employees (Backhouse and Dhillon, 1995; Kesar and Rogerson, 
1998; Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Dhillon et al, 2004).  Dhillon and Moores (2001), for 
example, while advocating traditional technical safeguards to limit access to computer 
systems and their programmes, further note the need for formal and informal controls.  
Formal safeguards include written policies for clarifying the appropriate security 
responsibilities and roles of staff.  These are complemented by informal controls, such as 
education and awareness campaigns which directly aim to influence the security behaviour 
of employees.  While the aforementioned papers have proven useful in discussing the need 
for a focus on the behavioural as well as technical safeguards for IS security, such 
discussions are held at a high level, and offer little guidance for practitioners, when 
considering the choice and application of suitable controls for specific contexts.  
 
2.2 Deterring offenders  
A number of researchers have focused specifically on the deterrent effect of safeguards 
(Campbell, 1988; Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Straub, 1990; Straub and Nance, 1990; 
Cardinali, 1995; Sherizen, 1995; Harrington, 1996; Straub and Welke, 1998).  Of this 
group, several have applied General Deterrence Theory to the IS security domain (Hoffer 
and Straub, 1989; Straub, 1990; Straub et al, 1992; Harrington, 1996; Straub and Welke, 
1998).  This criminological theory posits that: 
 
Individuals with an instrumental intent to commit antisocial acts can be dissuaded by the 
administration of strong disincentives and sanctions relevant to these acts.   
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(Straub and Welke, 1998, p. 445) 
 
Given the above, deterrent safeguards advanced by writers in the IS security field include, 
for example, detection and monitoring activities (Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Straub et al. 
1992), security awareness programmes (Straub and Welke, 1998) and codes of ethics 
(Harrington, 1996).     
 
General Deterrence Theory provides valuable insights into the deterrent effect of 
safeguards, but as soon as the offender moves beyond the point of deterrence and embarks 
on a criminal act the theory is limited.  Admittedly, writers in the IS security field have 
discussed General Deterrence Theory in terms of preventive controls and the relationship 
with computer criminals.  Indeed,  Straub and Welke (1998) argue IS security 
countermeasures consist of four separate, but related, activities which include i) deterrence, 
ii) prevention, iii) detection and iv) recovery.  These four areas are designed to enhance IS 
security by reducing systems risk.  As noted, the initial aim of an IS security 
countermeasures strategy would be to deter such activity.  If deterrence proved ineffective, 
the second part of the strategy would aim at preventing the offender from perpetrating 
computer crime.  Similarly, if preventive controls proved ineffective then detection 
activities are required, and so on.  However, with regards to the explanatory value of 
General Deterrence Theory, preventive controls are discussed only in terms of their 
deterrent effect.  As Straub and Welke note: 
 
 … all of these organizational responses [the four elements of the safeguard strategy] 
lead to a downstream effect of deterring future computer abuse …  From the perspective 
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of general deterrence theory, these four kinds of defense can contribute dynamically to a 
subsequent deterrent effect.  That is, potential abusers become convinced of the certainty 
and severity of punishment for committing certain acts when the effectiveness of the 
systems security is obvious or when it is communicated to them (Straub and Welke, 
1998, p. 446). 
 
However, as noted, General Deterrence Theory is unable to provide any theoretical insights 
into the actual act of perpetration, and the behaviour of offenders during such an act.   
 
2.3 Criminal intentions 
In a bid to enhance theoretical explanations of insider computer crime several writers have 
focussed on the criminal intentions of individuals.  Drawing on the theory of planned 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), Lee and Lee (2002) focus on the three factors, which according to 
advocates of the theory, form the intentions for behaviour.  These include attitudes toward 
the behaviour, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control.  Advancing their own 
interpretation of these three factors, Lee and Lee (2002) propose the use of criminological 
theory.  More specifically, they argue Social Bond Theory, Social Learning Theory and 
General Deterrence Theory can help explain how attitudes towards behaviour, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioural controls are formed.  For example, according to the 
theory of planned behaviour subjective norms refers to the social pressure that is placed on 
individuals, by their referent peers in the performance (or not, as the case may be) of 
specific behaviour.  Lee and Lee (2002), therefore advocate the use of Social Learning 
Theory to explain this phenomenon.  Used in the study of how individuals form criminal 
tendencies, this theory notes the influence of peers in transmitting delinquent values.   
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Lee et al (2004) also couch their work within the theory of planned behaviour.  They 
advance ‘an integrative model of computer abuse’ based on General Deterrence Theory and 
Social Control Theory (Hirschi, 1969).  The latter examines how four factors – attachments, 
commitment, involvement and belief – constitute a social bond between an individual and 
society.  This bond in effect acts as a form of social control.  Based on their interpretation 
of the theory, Lee et al (2004) propose that the factors which constitute a social bond can be 
used to represent ‘organizational trust’.  Drawing on General Deterrence Theory and Social 
Bond Theory, Lee et al develop a number of constructs and hypothesis to examine the 
influence of deterrence and ‘organisational trust’ on the intentions to commit computer 
abuse.  Based on the results of their study, they contend that the development of social 
bonds in the form of organisational trust could be one method of reducing the intentions for 
computer abuse.    
 
Hence, Lee and Lee (2002) and Lee et al (2004) have advocated the used of criminological 
theories to help explain how criminal intentions are formed.  While these theories may 
assist in understanding this phenomenon, this is not the same as explaining the criminal act 
(Ekblom; 1994; Clarke, 1997).  What are also required are complementary theories, which 
assist in the understanding of the offender/context relationship during perpetration. 
 
2.4 Attributes for Offending 
Other writers have considered the offender in terms of a series of attributes they require for 
the perpetration of computer crime (Parker, 1976, 1981, 1998; Wood, 2002).  Parker ( 
1998) argues practitioners need to consider all forms of what he calls ‘cyber-criminals’ in 
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terms of their skills, knowledge, resources, authority and motives (SKRAM).  In other 
words, what skills, knowledge etc. does an offender require for the commission of 
computer crime, and what are the implications for organisational security?  An alternative 
perspective is provided by Wood (2002) who solely focuses on the insider.  While similarly 
urging consideration of skills, knowledge and motives, Wood departs from Parker by 
advocating examination of the offender’s methods to avoid risk, the associated tactics and 
the processes involved in perpetration.  Indeed, given the nature of this paper, the latter is 
particularly relevant.  However, Wood fails to explain how risk avoidance methods, tactics 
and the processes involved in perpetration should be researched.  In addition, no theory is 
advanced to help examine these three factors.  This is also the case in terms of the attributes 
for offending, where Parker (1998) and Wood (2002) offer no guidance in terms of their 
study and no relevant theories are proposed.   
 
2.5 The Organisational Context 
Closely related to the attributes for offending is the consideration of the organisational 
context in which computer crime takes place (Becker, 1981; Sherizen, 1995).  Becker 
(1981) for example, argues for a focus on the organisational surroundings, rather than an 
individual’s personality, for predicting and preventing computer crime.  Becker asserts 
dishonest employees perceive the organisational context in a number of ways, and he 
provides a classification of seven ‘criminogenic environments’.  By this, Becker means that 
if the context of an organisation reflects one (or more) of the seven types, then the 
organisation will be vulnerable to various forms of computer crime.  So for example, one of 
the seven types, ‘the land of opportunity’, represents an organisational context in which 
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dishonest employees exploit security loopholes spotted during the course of their daily 
work activities.   Unfortunately, Becker (1981) does not elaborate on how the offender’s 
perceptions are formed, in terms of the organisational context, and hence how some 
environments are judged as criminogenic as opposed to others.   
 
Although the literature concerned with employee computer crime has proven useful in 
highlighting this problem and offering guidance for practitioners, there are, as noted, 
certain deficiencies.  The following section of the paper discusses the differences between 
those criminological theories which focus on the criminal act as opposed to theories of 
criminality.  The discussion serves as an introduction to a description of the two bodies of 
theory advanced in this paper, namely the Rational Choice Perspective and Situational 
Crime Prevention, which it is argued can help in addressing the deficiencies discussed in 
the literature review. 
 
 
3. Criminological theories of crime and criminality 
Clarke (1997) argues one ‘mistake’ made by modern criminology is that the task of 
explaining crime has been assumed to be the same as explaining the criminal (Gottfredsen 
and Hirschi, 1990).  ‘Dispositional’ criminological theories have been eager to provide 
accounts of why and how individuals through the  assimilation of specific social or 
psychological influences, or the inheritance of traits, are as a consequence more inclined to 
acts of a delinquent or criminal nature.  However, this is not the same as explaining the 
occurrence of crime, which, aside from requiring a motivated offender, also warrants an 
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opportunity.  Simply to explain criminal dispositions, Clarke contends, is only half the 
equation.  What is further required are explanations of how offenders interact with the 
setting in which crime may or may not take place (Ekblom, 1994).  Through developing 
such explanations, insights are afforded into the offender/context relationship, which can be 
used to inform prevention programmes.  As Clarke (2004) notes: 
 
When prevention and control are the objectives, research will need to focus more on how 
crime is committed and less on why it is committed.  Understanding the steps in the 
process of committing crime, and understanding the conditions that facilitate its 
commission, helps us to see how we can intervene to frustrate crime (Clarke, 2004, p. 
59). 
 
Two closely related criminological theories entitled the Rational Choice Perspective 
(Clarke and Cornish, 2000) and Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke, 1997) have proved 
central to understanding ‘the process of committing crime’.  It is for this reason that these 
approaches, are advanced in this paper for their application to the IS security field. In 
addition, these two schools of thought may offer a theoretical basis on which to analyse the 
offender/context relationship through an examination of the different procedural stages an 
offender must go through in the perpetration of a crime.  By so doing, practitioners may 
potentially use these insights to inform and enhance the selection of safeguards to prevent 
the successful perpetration of employee computer crime.   
 
The two approaches will now be described, followed by a discussion of how they may be 
applied to address the procedural stages of computer crime. 
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4. The Rational Choice Perspective and Situational Crime Prevention 
4.1 Rational Choice Perspective 
Central to the Rational Choice Perspective advocated by Clarke and Cornish (2000), are a 
number of propositions.  These include the assumption that crimes are deliberate and 
purposive: that is, those who commit crimes do so with the intention of deriving some type 
of benefit from such acts. Obvious examples are cash or material goods, but a broader 
reading of the term ‘benefits’ allows for the inclusion of other forms such as prestige, fun, 
excitement, sexual gratification, and domination. Joyriding is an example of how the 
benefits may take the intangible forms of fun and excitement.   
 
Another of the propositions relate to crime specificity.  The factors considered by criminals 
and the related variables that influence the decision-making process, vary considerably with 
the nature of the offence.  Thus an analysis of decision-making needs to be made with 
reference to specific categories of crime.  Legal categories of robbery and auto-theft are too 
generic, because these umbrella terms cover diversely motivated offences undertaken by a 
broad spectrum of offenders utilising a plethora of skills and methods.  For example, the 
theft of a car for temporary transport is different from the theft of a car for joyriding, which 
is again different to the theft of a car to be sold locally or overseas.  
 
Of further importance to the Rational Choice Perspective is the proposition that criminal 
choices can be categorised into two groups, viz., ‘involvement’ and ‘event’ decisions.  The 
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former relate to the three stages of the criminal or delinquent career.  The offender must 
make decisions about embarking on criminal activities, whether or not to continue these 
activities over a period of time, and when, if at all, to cease offending.  The latter refers to 
those decisions made during the commission of a crime, and in the case of suburban 
burglary, for example, could involve choices as to the target, the point of entry, and 
decisions about which items to steal. These choices are framed within the crime-specific 
focus. 
 
The final proposition to be discussed centres on the sequence of event decisions, which an 
offender faces during the commission of a crime. Original work in this area focused solely 
on choices made in terms of potential target selection (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish 
and Clarke 1986), but as a result of theoretical advancements it was realised that, as the 
criminal act unfolds, the perpetrator is required to make a series of decisions about other 
stages in the crime commission process (Clarke and Cornish, 2000). These stages include, 
for example, preparation for the crime and target selection.  
 
4.2 Situational Crime Prevention  
Situational Crime Prevention is a relatively new school of thought. Differing in its focus 
from most criminology, its starting point is an examination of those circumstances which 
afford specific kinds of crime.  Through an understanding of these situations, measures are 
introduced to induce change in the relevant environments with the aim of reducing the 
opportunities for specific crimes.  Its emphasis is therefore on the criminal setting.  Rather 
than sanctioning or detecting offenders, the intention is to deter the occurrence of crime, 
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and rather than seeking to reduce criminal tendencies through the enhancement of certain 
aspects of society, such as better housing or education, the relatively simple aim is to make 
criminal action less appealing to offenders (Clarke, 1997). 
 
Efforts to achieve this goal involve implementing opportunity reducing techniques, which 
target specific forms of crime and impact on the immediate criminal environment, in terms 
of its design, management or manipulation.  As can be seen in Table 1, associated with the 
techniques, are five major aims, which include increasing the effort or risks of crime, or 
reducing the potential rewards.  These are further complemented by removing the excuses 
for crime and negating provocative phenomena.  Examples of the techniques include target 
hardening (e.g. anti-robbery screens: to increase the effort), utilising place managers 
(multiple clerks in convenience stores: to increase the risks), target removal (e.g. 
removable car radios: to reduce the rewards), reducing frustrations and stress (e.g. efficient 
queues and polite service: to reduce provocations) and the setting of rules (e.g. harassment 
codes: to remove excuses), (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).   
 
In an attempt to block the commission of specific crimes, measures introduced into the 
immediate environment are designed to impact on the offender’s perceptions about the 
potential costs and benefits of crime commission.  In addition, it is assumed as part of the 
decision–making process that some evaluation is made with respect to the possible moral 
costs of offending. While some offenders may be prepared to shoplift, this does not mean 
they are prepared to mug the elderly.  In an attempt, however, to overcome any feelings of 
guilt or shame, offenders may try to neutralise such feeling through the construction of 
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Table 1: Twenty –five Techniques of Situational Prevention 
Increase the Effort Increase the Risks Reduce the Rewards Reduce Provocation Remove Excuses 
1. Target harden: 
• Steering column locks and 
immobilisers  
• Anti-robbery screens 
• Tamper-proof packaging 
6. Extend guardianship: 
• Take routine precautions: go out 
in group at night, leave signs of 
occupancy, carry phone 
• “Cocoon” neighbourhood watch 
 
11. Conceal targets: 
• Gender-neutral phone 
directories 
• Unmarked bullion 
trucks 
 
16.Reduce frustrations and 
stress: 
• Efficient queues and polite 
service 
• Expanded seating  
 
21.Set rules: 
• Rental agreements 
• Harassment codes 
• Hotel registration 
 
2. Control access to 
facilities: 
• Entry phones 
• Electronic card access 
• Baggage screening 
 
7. Assist natural surveillance: 
• Improved street lighting 
• Defensible space design  
• Support whistleblowers 
 
12. Remove targets: 
• Removable car radio 
• Women’s refuges 
• Pre-paid cards for pay 
phone 
 
17. Avoid disputes: 
• Separate enclosures for 
rival soccer fans 
• Reduce crowding in pubs 
• Fixed cab fares 
 
22.Post instructions: 
• “No Parking” 
• “Private Property” 
• “Extinguish camp 
fires” 
 
3. Screen exits: 
• Ticket needed for exit 
• Export documents 
• Electronic merchandise tags 
8. Reduce anonymity: 
• Taxi driver IDs 
• “How’s my driving?” decals 
• School uniforms 
 
13.Indentify property: 
• Property making  
• Vehicle licensing and 
parts marking 
• Cattle branding  
 
18.Reduce emotional 
arousal: 
• Controls on violent 
pornography 
• Enforce good behaviour on 
soccer field 
 
23.Alert conscience: 
• Roadside speed 
display boards 
• Signatures for customs 
declarations 
 
4. Deflect offenders: 
• Street closures 
• Separate bathrooms for 
women 
• Disperse pubs 
9. Utilize place managers: 
• CCTV for double-deck buses 
• Two clerks for convenience 
stores 
• Reward vigilance 
 
14.Discrupt markets: 
• Monitor pawn shops 
• Controls on classified 
ads 
• License street vendors 
 
19.Neutralise peer pressure: 
• “Idiots drink and drive” 
• “It’s ok to say No” 
• Disperse troublemakers at 
school 
 
24.Assist compliance: 
• Easy library checkout 
• Public lavatories 
• Litter bins 
 
5. Control tools/weapons: 
• “Smart” guns 
• Disabling stolen cell phones 
• Restrict spray paint sales to 
juveniles 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance: 
• Red light cameras 
• Burglar alarms 
• Security guards 
 
15.Deny benefits: 
• Ink merchandise tags 
• Graffiti cleaning  
• Speed humps 
 
20. Discourage imitation: 
• Rapid repair of vandalism 
• V-chips in TVs 
• Censor details of modus 
operandi 
 
25.Control drugs and 
alcohol:  
• Breathalysers in pubs 
• Servers intervention 
• Alcohol-free events 
 
 (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) 
 
excuses such as ‘everybody else does it’, ‘I’m just borrowing it’, etc (Clarke, 1997).  
Situational Crime Prevention theorists have further acknowledged how the immediate 
environment may not only afford potential opportunities, but also provoke criminal 
behaviour.  Hence a number of techniques have been developed to assuage such 
phenomena (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). 
 
A final point to mention, and in keeping with the Rational Choice Perspective, is 
Situational Crime Prevention’s crime specific focus. Forgoing, for example, a discussion of 
crime prevention at the level of ‘burglary’ or ‘robbery’, greater emphasis is placed on those 
specific crimes that fall under these broader categories.  The argument advanced is that 
only a detailed understanding at the level of ‘specific crimes’ will afford insights for 
prevention programmes. Hence, Poyner and Webb (1991) assert that preventive measures, 
needed for tackling burglary of domestic electronic goods, differ from those required to 
prevent the burglary of household cash or jewellery, owing to the differences in the way 
these crimes are committed. 
 
 
5. The Application of the Rational Choice Perspective to IS Security 
While underpinning the techniques advocated by Situational Crime Prevention, at a broader 
level the Rational Choice Perspective provides a framework for helping to explain all forms 
of crime.  The framework acts as a basis for modelling criminal decision making (Clarke 
and Cornish, 2000).   
 
5.1 Involvement Decisions 
 As previously considered, involvement and event decisions form the two main groups 
encompassed by the Rational Choice framework. The former focuses on three stages of the 
criminal career, which include initiation, habituation and desistance. The extent to which 
modelling these three stages would provide prevention insights for the IS security field is 
problematic.  This is largely due to the fact that these stages are themselves influenced by 
‘background factors’, ‘current life circumstances’ and ‘situational variables’. Clouding the 
issue further are additional problems related to the category of ‘background factors’.  Citing 
computer fraud as a case in point, Cornish and Clarke (1986) note how with certain forms 
of crime, the offender’s ‘background factors’ (which include upbringing, social class, 
ethnicity, educational opportunities etc.) appear to have little influence on involvement 
decisions.  Hence, attempting to model the three stages of involvement decisions may prove 
difficult and ultimately fruitless. However, it is believed that greater inroads can be made 
into modelling the criminal behaviour associated with event decisions.    
 
5.2 Event Decisions 
These types of choices are made during the commission process and are framed within a 
crime specific focus. Early research into this area concentrated on the choices made in 
terms of the criminal target, but, as a result of theoretical advancements, it was realised that 
the commission of a crime involves a sequence of event decisions. Clarke and Cornish 
(2000) note, for example, how: 
 
In the case of suburban burglary, the event may be sparked by some random occurrence, 
such as two burglars meeting up, both of whom need money … Plans begin to be made 
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and a car or van may be stolen for transport.  The next step involves travelling to the 
neighbourhood selected and identifying a house to enter.  Ideally, this holds the promise 
of good pickings without the chance of being disturbed by the owners. A point of entry 
that it not too difficult or risky must then be found.  Getting into the house and rapidly 
choosing the goods to steal follow this stage.  The goods must then be carried to the car 
without being seen by neighbours or passers-by.  Afterwards, they may have to be 
stashed safely while a purchaser is found.  Finally, they must be conveyed to the buyer 
and exchanged for cash. 
 (Clarke and Cornish, 2000, p. 31). 
 
As the burglary example illustrates, other decisions are made at the various stages of the 
whole commission process. If the stages and the associated decisions can be identified, the 
preventive scope for many diverse contexts could feasibly be extended.  Safeguards could 
be implemented which influence the potential offender’s choices, leading to the cessation 
of the criminal act. 
 
In an attempt to correctly identify the stages in the commission process, Cornish (1994a, 
1994b) advances the concept of crime scripts. The origins of this concept can be found in 
the field of cognitive science, which has addressed the production and understanding of 
sequences of events and actions (Gardner, 1985). More specifically scripts: 
 
 … constitute one of a family of hypothesised knowledge structures, or schemata, long 
considered by cognitive psychologists and cognitive social psychologists to organise our 
knowledge of people and events in ways which guide our understanding of other’s 
behaviour, and our own actions.  The script is generally viewed as being a special type 
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of schema, known as an ‘event’ schema, since it organizes our knowledge about how to 
understand and enact commonplace behavioural processes or routines. 
(Cornish, 1994a, p. 32).   
 
The concept derives its name from the recognition of how knowledge about processes and 
routines takes a specific form, similar to a theatrical script (Schank and Abelson, 1977). An 
example of such a process is the ‘restaurant script’, which organises an individual’s 
knowledge about what to do in such a context. The sections of the script include entering 
the establishment, finding a table, ordering, eating, paying the bill and leaving.  As the 
example illustrates, scripts comprise event sequences extended over time.  The events in the 
sequence are interrelated given that events at the early stages of a script afford the 
occurrence of later ones. For example, in the restaurant script a customer cannot order until 
they have found a table.   
 
Hence the scripts concept focuses on behavioural processes involved in rational goal-
oriented actions. Moreover, the concept affords ‘concrete explanations about specific 
actions in specific domains’ (Hewstone, 1989, p. 103). Given this, Cornish argues that the 
script concept can act as a useful tool for analysing the ‘event’ stages in the commission of 
a specific crime i.e. scripts can be used to address the procedural stages of an offence.  As 
he notes: 
 
A script-theoretic approach offers a way of generating, organising and systematising 
knowledge about the procedural aspects and procedural requirements of crime 
commission.  It has the potential to provide more appropriately crime-specific accounts 
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of crime commission, and to extend this analysis to all the stages of the crime-
commission sequence. 
 (Cornish, 1994b, p. 160) 
 
Aside from utilising the knowledge of IS security practitioners, two additional sources can 
be used to generate crime scripts.  They include offender accounts and secondary sources of 
data such as published research, security surveys, newspaper accounts etc. While there are 
obvious practical problems associated with obtaining offender accounts, preliminary efforts 
could be initiated by the construction of ‘draft’ scripts through the use of secondary sources 
and practitioner knowledge.  To aid in their development, Cornish (1994a, 1994b) argues 
that the universal script can act as a useful guiding framework.  Common to all scripts are a 
set of generalised scenes, which form the basis of the universal script.  The separate 
elements of this type of script are sequential in order and together they provide a 
framework that could be used by researchers or practitioners for modelling the commission 
of a specific crime.  In essence, each ‘scene/function’ stage of the universal script can be 
viewed as a procedural stage of a crime. 
 
Table 2 provides the example of a ‘subway mugging’ universal script. Under the 
‘scene/function’ heading are listed the procedural stages of the universal script. The second 
column cites the corresponding criminal behaviour for each stage. Once the crime scripts 
have been generated, clearer insights are provided into the procedural stages of the 
particular offence.  The practitioner is then given the ability to systematically implement 
the appropriate controls once granted a greater understanding of a particular crime.  
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Table 2: Subway Mugging Script  
 
SCENE / FUNCTION SCRIPT FUNCTION 
PREPARATION Meet and agree on hunting ground 
ENTRY Entry into underground system 
PRE-CONDITION Travel to hunting ground 
PRE-CONDITION Waiting/circulating at hunting ground 
INSTRUMENTAL PRE-CONDITION Selecting victim and circumstance 
INSTRUMENTAL 
 INITIATION 
Closing–in/preparation 
INSTRUMENTAL 
 ACTUALIZATION 
Striking at victim 
INSTRUMENTAL 
 ACTUALIZATION 
Pressing home attack 
DOING Take money, jewelry, etc. 
POST-CONDITION Escape from scene 
EXIT Exit from system 
(Cornish, 1994b) 
 
An example of a computer crime script is illustrated in Table 3. Based on details cited in 
the 1998 UK Audit Report (Audit Commission, 1998) the crime in question involved a 
local council employee who committed computer fraud.  Taking advantage of poor access 
security (colleagues failed to lock their computers when leaving the office for a substantial 
period of time), the employee would wait until other members of staff had vacated the 
office.  He would then access their computers to process the fraud.  In total £15,000 was 
embezzled, through the setting-up, inputting and authorisation of fictitious invoices.  
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Table 3: Computer Fraud Script 
SCENCE FUNCTION SCRIPT ACTION SITUATIONAL 
CONTROL 
Preparation Deliberately gaining 
access to the organisation 
Prospective employee 
screening 
Entry Already authorised as 
employee 
------ 
Pre-condition Wait for employees 
absence from offices. 
Physical segregation of 
duties. 
Staggered breaks 
Signing In/Out of offices 
Instrumental  
Pre-Condition 
Access colleagues’ 
computers 
System time outs 
Biometric fingerprint 
authentication 
Instrumental 
Initiation 
Access programmes 
 
Password use for access 
to specific programmes 
Instrumental 
Actualization 
False customer account 
construction 
Two person sign-off on 
creation of new accounts 
Doing Authorisation of fictitious 
invoices 
Audit of computer logs 
Budget monitoring 
 
Post Condition Exit programmes ------ 
Exit Exit system User event viewer 
Doing Later Spend the transferred 
money 
------ 
 
 
As noted, with each corresponding script action there is the aim of implementing 
corresponding controls.  However, unlike the more traditional crimes addressed by 
Situational Crime Prevention and the Rational Choice Perspective, employee computer 
abuse which is perpetrated in the organisational context can be termed ‘specialized access 
crimes’ (Felson, 2002).  In other words, only those people who have access to the 
environment are in a position to commit the crime.  It is, therefore, difficult to implement 
‘entry’ and ‘exit’ controls, for staff who have access to the criminal context as a result of 
their employment.  But, as noted earlier, the elements of a script are interrelated and the 
script’s actions in a prior stage afford the existence in a later one. In Table 3, therefore, the 
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‘entry’ into the organisation is achieved by ‘deliberately gaining access to the organisation’.  
Hence, specialized access crimes can involve either i) long range planning, whereby an 
individual deliberately applies for a job with the intention of committing an offence, or  ii) 
where an individual applies for a job without criminal intent, but later on, for whatever 
reason (e.g. becomes disgruntled, develops an addiction, marriage breakdown etc.), decides 
to perpetrate a crime.  Table 3 presupposes the former.  Therefore, an appropriate control at 
the ‘Preparation’ stage would be the screening of prospective employees.   
 
While the discussion of the ‘entry’ into environments, which enable specialised access 
crimes, may appear pedantic, it is precisely this attention to detail which helps to produce 
effective scripts.   
 
Using the universal framework as a guide to script creation invites consideration of all the 
procedural aspects of the offence ensuring that no aspect of the commission process is 
overlooked.  In addition the universal script permits examination of the process from the 
offender’s viewpoint and actions.  In this way, common-sense ‘knowledge’ about crime 
commission can potentially be debunked and a more rigorous understanding of the 
commission process can be afforded to those addressing IS security.  Ignoring the realities 
of such behaviour, may result in failing to apply appropriate safeguards or applying 
safeguards which are inappropriate.  Corresponding controls, therefore, can only be 
implemented if the actions which warrant their application are correctly identified. 
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While examining offender behaviour, scripts also draw attention to the required attributes 
for perpetration.  As noted, Parker (1998) and Wood (2002) have stressed the need to 
consider the offender in terms of certain attributes such as skills, knowledge, access and 
resources.  The scripts method can enhance this analysis owing to its focus on the 
offender/context relationship.  Hence, offender attributes are more clearly identified as 
specific contexts plays a large role in defining and delimiting them.  So, for example, in the 
local council fraud, the rogue employee presumably required accounting skills and 
knowledge of the particular invoicing system.    By systematically working through the 
script stages practitioners could feasibly acquire greater insights into attributes required by 
the offender.  This would hopefully enhance prevention programmes by looking at ways of 
denying access to such attributes.   
 
 
6. The Application of Situational Crime Prevention to IS Security 
The twenty-five techniques advocated by Situational Crime Prevention could be adopted by 
practitioners to complement script analysis.  Using the Situational Crime Prevention 
techniques as a guide potentially enables the practitioner to consider new and alternative 
safeguard options for influencing the offender’s decision-making processes.  In conjunction 
with the script analysis the techniques may therefore enable the practitioner to optimise 
safeguard selection in the following manner.  First, the scripts analysis can help in 
identifying all the stages in the commission process, and secondly, the techniques allow for 
consideration of alternative safeguards per each stage. 
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Some of the SCP techniques are already implicitly used in the organisational context.  
Examples include property marking (to identify property), clear desk/screen policies (to 
remove targets), anti-virus detection (to target harden) and firewalls (to screen exits).  
However in a bid to enhance the selection of safeguards for each stage, existing IS security 
controls could be categorised according to the 25 techniques.   Table 4 represents a first 
attempt to classify some of the safeguards cited in the ‘Information Technology - Security 
Techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Management ISO/IEC 17799: 
2005’, according to the 25 techniques.   
 
While it proved relatively easy to find examples for some of the twenty five categories, this 
was not the case for others which have a limited number or no examples cited.  However, 
this is to be expected given that these techniques (and their associated controls) have been 
used and developed in a number of diverse contexts in a bid to reduce the opportunities for 
crime.  Hence, the extent to which safeguards based on ‘Reduce Emotional Arousal’ and 
‘Disrupt Markets’ are suitable for the organisational context is debatable, but this does not 
mean that they should be rejected outright.  Rather they should be examined in future 
research by looking at how the controls, which fall under these headings, have been used 
and their potential for the IS context considered.  Indeed, just through constructing the table 
the author thought of several other controls, which are not cited in the standard, but could 
be incorporated into the classification.  These safeguards are underlined in Table 4.  So, for 
example, the classification of controls under category number 11 entitled ‘Conceal Targets’ 
include the measure ‘Reduce Website Details’.  The latter relates to the threat posed by 
social engineers.  This group of computer criminals target personnel in organisations.  
Table 4: IS Security Safeguards Categorised According to the 25 SCP techniques 
Increase the Effort Increase the Risks Reduce the Rewards Reduce Provocation Remove Excuses 
6. Target harden: 
a) Anti-virus detection for 
PCs  
b) Security education for 
staff 
c) Physical locks for PCs 
6. Extend guardianship: 
a) Staff chaperoning of visitors. 
b) Supervision of staff in secure 
areas 
c) Guardianship of mobile 
facilities outside offices. 
11. Conceal targets: 
a) Minimise ID of offices 
b) Conceal use of PCs 
when travelling 
c) Reduce website details 
 
16.Reduce frustrations and 
stress: 
 
21.Set rules: 
a) IS security polices 
b) Disciplinary 
procedures 
c) Conflicts of interest 
guidelines 
7. Control access to 
facilities: 
a) Swipe card for office 
access 
b) Physical locks for doors 
c) Password systems 
 
7. Assist natural surveillance: 
a) Open plan offices 
b) Support whistleblowers 
 
12. Remove targets: 
a) Clear desk and 
computer screens 
b) Paper shredders 
c) Secure disposal of old 
PCs 
d) Regulate use of DSB 
devices 
 
17. Avoid disputes: 
 
 
22.Post instructions: 
a) Email disclaimers 
8. Screen exits: 
a) Firewalls 
b) Security guards 
c) Reception desks 
8. Reduce anonymity: 
a) ID tags for staff 
b) Audit trails 
c) Event logging 
 
 
13.Indentify property: 
a) Property marking  
b) Digital signatures  
 
18.Reduce emotional 
arousal: 
  
23.Alert conscience: 
a) Copying software is 
illegal 
9. Deflect offenders: 
a) Segregation of duties 
b) Confidentiality agreements 
c) Personnel screening 
 
9. Utilize place managers: 
a) Management supervision 
b) Two person sign-off 
c) Monitoring by systems admin’r  
 
 
14.Discrupt markets: 
 
19.Neutralise peer pressure: 
 
24.Assist compliance: 
a) Security education for 
staff 
b) Single sign-on 
 
10. Control 
tools/weapons: 
a) Password mgt systems 
b) Download controls 
c) Deletion of access rights 
for ex-employees 
 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance: 
a) Intrusion detection systems 
b) Security guards 
 
15.Deny benefits: 
a) Encryption 
b) Property marking 
c) Software dongles 
 
 
20. Discourage imitation: 
a) Rapid repair for web 
defacement 
b) Prompt software patching 
25.Control drugs and 
alcohol:  
a) Drug testing 
Adopting the false identity of an employee, a journalist, supplier etc. the social engineer 
acquires potentially lucrative information from the organisation, based usually on telephone 
calls with the target (an unwitting member of staff).  Unfortunately organisations often aid 
social engineers by placing far too much information on their websites about employees, 
their job responsibilities and the department in which they work.  Social engineers can 
either adopt the persona of someone cited on a website, or use their details to sound more 
credible to the target. Hence, by reducing website details organisations can potentially 
‘conceal targets’. 
 
As noted, the Situational Crime Prevention techniques encompass areas of prevention 
which are relatively unexplored by IS security practitioners and whose exploitation may 
prove fruitful.  One area that appears to offer great potential is the category ‘Remove 
Excuses’.  An earlier categorisation of the techniques focussed on attempts to increase the 
risks and efforts and reduce the rewards of crime (Clarke, 1992). Here, the measures tended 
to rely on the physical manipulation of the criminal environment in an attempt to reduce the 
opportunities for crime.  More recently, however, the Rational Choice Perspective has 
developed to consider how some offenders assess their own morality, and how they are 
often able to absolve themselves of the guilt and shame associated with criminal acts.  Such 
absolution is achieved by individuals rationalising their actions in a manner which helps 
neutralise these negative emotions. Common examples of these rationalisations include ‘I 
was just borrowing it’ and ‘everybody else does it’. Support for this assertion comes from 
earlier criminological and psychological research (Sykes and Matza, 1957; Bandura, 1976, 
1977).  Focusing on the area of juvenile delinquency, Sykes and Matza, (1957) identify five 
‘techniques of neutralisation’. Similarly, Bandura (1976, 1977) in attempting to explain the 
maintenance of aggressive behaviour, discusses how ‘self-reinforcing’ influences which 
help to regulate an individual’s conduct, can be divorced from aggressive actions. He 
argues that this is achieved through ‘cognitive disengagement’, and identifies ten forms. 
Hence, a group of measures aimed at ‘removing excuses’ (i.e. the rationalisations) has been 
advocated (Clarke and Homel, 1997; Clarke, 1997).  If offenders can be stopped from 
rationalising and excusing their criminal actions in specific settings, then they will be open 
to feelings of guilt and shame.   
 
There has been some consideration of these rationalisation in the IS security field 
(Harrington, 1996, Sherizen, 1995), but a more systematic consideration and exploitation of 
these techniques may complement existing prevention practices.  For example, Cornish and 
Clarke (2003) advance five types of ‘removing excuses’ techniques, but similar work in this 
area has been undertaken by Worltey (1996) who identifies four broad strategies through 
which IS security methods could possibly be enhanced.  These areas include ‘rule setting’, 
‘clarifying responsibility’, ‘clarifying consequences’ and ‘increasing victim worth’.  So, for 
example, with regard to ‘increasing victim worth’, such a strategy recognises how offenders 
find it easier to perpetrate crimes if they perceive their victims to be ‘unworthy’, ‘sub-
human’, ‘outsiders’, ‘anonymous’, or ‘deserving of the fate’. The prevention strategy 
entails attempts to reduce depersonalization and develop an emotional bond between 
potential offenders and victims.  Wortley notes how it is not just individuals but also 
organisations which are open to this form of offender derogation.  Discussing the example 
of organisational fraud, he argues: 
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 Employee share schemes, incentive schemes and general attention to reducing job 
dissatisfaction may increase in employees a sense of attachment to a company and 
inhibit their ability to portray the company in ways that justify acting fraudulently 
against it (Wortley, 1996, pp. 122-123).  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
IS security represents a growing concern for organisations.  While external threats require 
due consideration, the threat posed by rogue employees should not be ignored.  From an 
academic perspective a modest but growing number of texts have addressed the insider 
threat.  However, to date, there has been a lack of attention given to the relationship 
between the actual behaviour of offenders during the perpetration of computer crime, and 
the organisational context in which such behaviour takes place.  To address this deficiency 
the Rational Choice Perspective and Situational Crime Prevention are advanced in this 
paper, for addressing the procedural stages of crime.  Central to the Rational Choice 
Perspective is an examination of criminal decisions.  Event decisions encompass those 
choices made by the offender during the crime commission process.  By using the scripts 
method, the various related stages of this process could feasibly be identified.  In this way, 
the goal would be to identify the offender behaviour per each stage and implement controls 
accordingly.  Hence the IS security strategy would aim to disrupt the criminal act through 
the implementation of safeguards which influence the offender’s choices and prevent 
successful perpetration. 
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 The Situational Crime Prevention techniques, based on the conceptualisation of the 
offender as advocated by the Rational Choice Perspective, could feasibly be used to 
complement the scripts method.  While some of the techniques are already employed in the 
IS domain, consideration of the complete range advanced by Situational Crime Prevention 
potentially enables the practitioner to systematically, and explicitly, consider all the 
alternative safeguard options for influencing the offender’s decision making processes.   
 
Currently organisations can draw on a number of means for guidance on safeguard 
selection.  These include the use of risk assessment techniques (Peltier, 2004), international 
standards, such as ISO BS17799 (ISO BS17799, 2005), or the ‘baseline security’ approach 
(Parker, 1998), where controls are selected based on best practice principles.  Irrespective 
of whether an organisation uses one or more of these means, the Rational Choice 
Perspective and Situational Crime Prevention can both complement existing security 
practices.  The scripts approach can help in understanding the offender/context relationship.  
Through a greater understanding of offender choices and the associated behaviour, 
consideration can then be given to appropriate safeguards.  As noted, the opportunity 
reducing techniques advanced by Situational Crime Prevention can potentially act as a 
guide for practitioners by enabling them to systematically consider all the safeguard options 
for influencing the offender’s decision-making process.   
 
Future research could encompass the development of crime scripts through the use of the 
action research method (Mathiassen, 2002; Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1998).  More 
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precisely research could involve the use of the universal script as the basis for such 
development.  In this sense, the action research method would be used to evaluate the 
feasibility of developing scripts in the organisational context.   
 
As part of the script development process, future research could also encompass the use of 
the twenty-five SCP techniques.  Would the practitioners view the schema as restricting or 
a useful brainstorming tool in the process of safeguard selection?  Could the techniques 
encourage innovation in the area of IS security prevention and facilitate the incorporation 
of controls in areas previously not considered?         
 
In relation to the above, and as noted, the Situational Crime Prevention techniques cover 
aspects of prevention which are relatively unexplored by IS security researchers.  The 
category of techniques entitled ‘removing excuses’ is a case in point.  Underpinned by 
rationalization theories advanced by Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura (1976, 1977), 
these techniques represent potentially fruitful areas for future research.   
 
Applying criminological theories to the IS context, has the potential for providing new 
perspectives and insights, for enhancing security strategies.  While progress has been made 
in recognising and enhancing how employees are central to the security of an organisation 
(Siponen, 2005), focus should also be placed on how some staff overcome such security 
through criminal behaviour.  To date the application of criminological theory to the IS 
security field has been minimal, but where better to find insight into crime and criminals 
than from a body of knowledge which examines precisely that.   
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